Talk:Indo-Pakistani war of 1965

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Listed below are twenty (20) scholarly sources that make the case that the India-Pakistan wars of 1947 and 1965 were military stalemates. Some sources while pronouncing the judgment of military stalemate also consider some strategic or political advantages accruing to India in the 1965 war. By "scholarly" I mean the university presses and in addition Routledge, Wiley, Palgrave, Springer, and Hurst. I have not included trade paperbacks published by Harper Collins, Vintage, and so forth. Here is the list, which I have collapsed on account of its length:

Twenty scholarly sources on the outcome of the wars of 1947–48 and 1965

In Nayar, Baldev Raj; Paul, T. V. (2003), India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–91, ISBN 978-0-521-52875-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 374) In regard to the element of exercising initiative in war-making, Pakistan launched the first violent conflict with India hardly three months after its creation in 1947 through supporting a tribal invasion of Kashmir and then directly participating in the consequent war with India. In the international negotiations at the UN over the war, Pakistan was able to get the support of the UK and the US; even though India retained nearly two-thirds of the state, the issue was not conclusively settled and remained a long-term cause for repeated future conflicts. About two decades later, Pakistan started armed skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in order to test India's will and preparedness, and then induct-ed a massive force of commandos into Kashmir with the purpose of detaching that state from India; in the process, it precipitated the India—Pakistan War of 1965, the result of which was largely a military stalemate." In Chari, P R; Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal; Cohen, Stephen P (2003), Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, Routledge, p. 41, ISBN 978-1-134-39680-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 57) Unlike 1947-8, the 1965 war was a short affair. The UN sponsored ceasefire became effective on September 23, 1965. Although both sides have since claimed victory in 1965, the war actually ended in a stalemate." In Snedden, Christopher (2015), Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Hurst, pp. 267–, ISBN 978-1-84904-622-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) 1. May 1948-1 January 1949: India-Pakistan war; limited to J&K; ended with United Nations' brokered ceasefire on 1 January 1949; result was indecisive, although J&K divided thereafter by the 1949 ceasefire line; war followed fighting that began in J&K soon after the British withdrawal in 1947, particularly in the Poonch area of Jammu Province where 'rebels' fought the forces of Maharaja Hari Singh, then Indian forces after he acceded to India on 26 October 1947; the war is dated from May 1948 because Pakistan's armed forces only then officially became involved in J&K. 2. 20 October-21 November 1962: China-India war; fighting in Aksai Chin and north-east India; China won decisively; took place before China-Pakistan relations became intimate. 3. August-22 September 1965: India-Pakistan war; instigated by subversives sent into J&K by Pakistan; fought in J&K and across the western India-Pakistan border; it followed some serious India-Pakistan skirmishing in the Rann of Kutch in March—April 1965; ceasefire declared after international pressure; result was a stalemate." In Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1991), War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, pp. 8–, ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 450) Similarly, the wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49 and 1965 had been brought to a stalemate and mediated through international intervention." In Schofield, Julian (2007), Militarization and War, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 52, ISBN 978-1-137-07719-6(Google Scholar Citation Index: 18) "India's curtailing of military influence was in part a response to the fear of a military coup, but the relative remoteness of South Asia to third-party balancers made reliance on diplomatic strategy and neglect of military means dangerous. India's nonmilitarization led it to a traumatic military defeat in 1962 at the hands of China, to defeat against Pakistan in 1965 at the Rann of Kutch, and to stalemate against Pakistan in September 1965." In Cohen, Stephen P. (2013), Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum, Brookings Institution Press, p. 129, ISBN 978-0-8157-2187-1)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 59) "Their first war was purposeful: Pushtun raiders sent by the NWFP government invaded Kashmir. The incursion was met with an innovative Indian response, resulting in a military stalemate and a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate peace. India's encroachment on territory held by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962 was also purposeful, as was Pakistan's probe in Kutch and in Kashmir in 1965, and its 1999 Kargil gambit. Several near-wars were also purposeful: India's Brasstacks exercise was intended to provoke a Pakistani response, which in turn was to have led to a decisive Indian counterattack. One could add to this list India's seizure of the heights of the Siachen Glacier. Most of these operations ended in defeat or disaster." In Rudolph, Lloyd I.; Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber (1987), In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, University of Chicago Press, pp. 133–, ISBN 978-0-226-73139-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 1143) "Under syndicate leadership, Congress ideology was more than ever perceived as empty rhetoric, mantras without meaning, repeated in manifestos and important party occasions. In Delhi, state capitals, and district towns, the politics of persons and factions crowded aside the politics of national purpose and high policy. The ground was being prepared for the electoral and organizational crises of 1967 and 1969, in the face of two consecutive bad monsoons (1965 and 1966), a draw in a major war with Pakistan (1965), and an unsuccessful devaluation (1966). In the fourth general election of 1967, Congress lost power in eight large states and almost did so nationally; two years later, it split for the first time." In Montgomery, Evan Braden (2016), In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Cornell University Press, pp. 112–113, ISBN 978-1-5017-0400-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 12) "Second, despite the considerable relative power advantage that India seemed to enjoy on paper, it soon became apparent that New Delhi was not going to emerge as a local hegemon that could dominate South Asia, if it managed to achieve a victory at all. Rather, the Second Kashmir War demonstrated to U.S. officials that India would remain preoccupied with Pakistan because it was not yet strong enough to break free of the balance of power on the subcontinent. In short, the hegemonic power shift that was taking place was incomplete. This, in turn, forced Washington to revise its earlier assessments and reconsider its regional strategy. ... By mid-September, the conflict had devolved into a stalemate. In Washington, Komer reported to President Johnson that the military situation on the ground was "confused," that successful Pakistani counterattacks had New Delhi "quite worried," and that he and others believed that Pakistan "will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector," at least until its armed forces started to run short of supplies. With neither side able to achieve a decisive victory, senior U.S. officials began to take a much darker view of the region as a whole and India's prospects as a rising power." In Dittmer, Lowell (2015), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China: India, Pakistan, and China, Routledge, pp. 114–, ISBN 978-1-317-45956-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 50) " In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border incident in the Rann of Kutch, which was resolved in its favor. Emboldened, the Pakistanis authorized Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating troops across the border in hopes of raising up a popular revolt. These efforts failed, and escalated into a more conventional military conflict that ended in stalemate. The net result for Pakistan, however, was particularly poor—it not only failed to accomplish its political aims, but also lost the aid and support of its U.S. ally." In Batra, Amita (2012), Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: Trapped in Conflict?, Routledge, pp. 83–, ISBN 978-1-135-12983-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 12) "1948-49: The first full-scale conflict between the two countries happened over Kashmir within a year after the two countries gained independence. The war began in 1947 and ended in December 1948. A UN-brokered ceasefire went into effect on January 1, 1949. 1965: The two countries clashed again in 1965 over Kashmir. The war began in August 5, 1965, and ended in September 22, 1965, by which time it had reached a stalemate and the two sides agreed to a UN-mandated ceasefire. In Shekhawat, Seema (2014), Gender, Conflict and Peace in Kashmir: Invisible Stakeholders, Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–, ISBN 978-1-139-91676-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) "India and Pakistan fought the second war in 1965. The Rann of Kutch issue preceded the outbreak of formal hostilities. ... In the first week of August 1965 under codename Operation Gibraltar the Pakistani military began infiltrating forces in Kashmir across the 470-mile-long Ceasefire Line. The first major engagement between regular armed forces of the two countries took place on 14 August 1965. India's early gains prompted Pakistan to mount Operation Grand Slam on 1 September to capture Akhnoor bridge and cut off supplies to the southwest of the Indian side of Kashmir. On 5 September 1965, the Pakistani army launched a major assault and penetrated 14 miles in J&K. Indian forces counter-attacked from Punjab and crossed the international border." By mid-September 1965, the war had reached a stalemate. The UNSC unanimously passed a resolution on 20 September 1965, calling for a ceasefire, which ended the impasse on 23 September 1965." In Fortna, Virginia Page (2004), Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, Princeton University Press, pp. 63–64, ISBN 0-691-11512-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 439) "THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR, 1965 Infiltrations into Indian-controlled Kashmir by mujahedin increased over the first half of 1965, and in August at least a thousand raiders crossed the cease-fire line from Azad Kashmir. Though Pakistan denied it, by all impartial accounts, Pakistan instigated and coordinated this gue-rilla attack in the hopes of triggering a revolt on whose behalf it could then intervene. The Pakistani plan failed to produce the hoped-for rebellion, however; Kashmiris were increasingly unhappy with Indian rule, but they were not yet interested in armed revolt. India responded to the infiltration by attacking across the cease-fire line to cut off the guerillas. By the beginning of September regular forces from both sides were fighting each other, and on September 6 India attacked across the international border, escalating the war beyond the confines of Kashmir itself. The war quickly reached a military stalemate.There was strong diplomatic pressure for a cease-fire, as the United States and the USSR reached a rare moment of Cold War consensus. The UN called for a cease-fire on September 4 (Resolution 209)" In Carpenter, William M.; Wiencek, David G. (2000), Asian Security Handbook 2000, M.E. Sharpe, pp. 41–42, ISBN 978-0-7656-0714-0([ Google Scholar Citation Index: ]) "Kashmir, a princely state headed by a Hindu Maharaja filing over a largely Muslim population, probably would have gone to Pakistan, but when Pathan tribesmen invaded Kashmir in October 1947, the Maharaja sided with India as a condition for Indian military aid and his survival. Pakistan objected and full-scale fighting broke out between the two newly independent neighbors) Despite early Indian military gains, the forces of Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir," as the part of Kashmir under Pakistani control is called) seized the initiative and drove the Indian troops from the border. In spring 1948, India mounted another offensive to retake lost ground, but New Delhi soon recognized that the war would not end unless Pakistan withdrew support for the Azad Kashmir forces. On the advice of Earl Mountbatten (Britain's last viceroy in India and governor general from 1947 to 1948), India invited the United Nations to mediate the conflict. ... War broke out again over Kashmir when Pakistani-sponsored guerrillas infiltrated into Indian Kashmir in August 1965. Indian forces scored early victories and fighting quickly intensified throughout Kashmir. In September 1965, Pakistan widened the conflict by counterattacking in Punjab, where Indian forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The war had reached a point of stalemate when the UN Security Council once again brokered a cease-fire, which India and Pakistan accepted after suffering nearly 3,000 battlefield deaths apiece. The cease-fire line, or "Line of Control," now serves as a quasi-border in Kashmir. In Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–45, ISBN 978-0-521-76721-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 73) "Failure to resolve the Kashmir issue led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. This conflict produced a military stalemate, but when the ground situation appeared to be going against India, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to resolve the political and territorial dispute over Kashmir.' The Security Council decided that the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan must be decided by the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite.' Nehru and subsequent Indian leaders gradually reneged from their promise of a plebiscite (although, to be sure, other UNSC terms also remained unfulfilled), but continued to accept the disputed nature of Kashmir. ... India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir in 1965, the outcome of which was another stalemate." In Wirsing, Robert (1998), War Or Peace on the Line of Control?: The India-Pakistan Dispute Over Kashmir Turns Fifty, IBRU: Centre for Border Research, Durham University, p. 12, ISBN 978-1-897643-31-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 6) "The plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, was aimed at provoking an uprising against Indian rule among the indigenous Kashmiri population. Indian forces stopped many of the would-be infiltrators at the border, however, and no uprising materialised to bolster those who made it across. The effort has been judged by most commentators, including the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army at the time, a colossal failure (Musa, 1983: 35-44). It signalled the complete collapse of the Karachi Agreement and led directly to the second war between India and Pakistan, again without any formal declaration. ... Steady escalation of the fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir during the last two weeks of August was followed, on 1 September, by a major cross-border attack by regular Pakistani forces in the state's southern sector. That attack brought massive Indian retaliation on 6 September across the international border cast of Lahore. The fighting, which involved air as well as ground forces, reached a stalemate by mid-September. Soon thereafter, responding to a UN Security Council resolution demanding an unconditional ceasefire, the guns fell silent on 22 September. Indian battle deaths in the conflict numbered around 3,000, Pakistan's around 3,800. India had lost about 775km' (299 sq. miles) of territory, Pakistan about 1,865km' (720 sq. miles) (Ganguly, 1986: 59)." In Bose, Sumantra (2009), Contested Lands, Harvard University Press, pp. 174–, ISBN 978-0-674-02856-2 (Google scholar citation index: 193)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 195) "Stalled at the United Nations and rebuffed by the Indian leadership, the Pakistanis resorted to force to challenge the status quo in Kashmir. Encouraged by a flare-up of unrest with strong anti-Indian overtones in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1963-1964, the Pakistani military regime, headed by the dictator Ayub Khan, formulated an ambitious plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, to seize Indian-controlled Kashmir. In August 1965 this plan was put into operation when several thousand Pakistani soldiers and armed volunteers from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir infiltrated the CFL, into Indian-controlled Kashmir with the intention of fomenting a mass uprising. That intention was foiled when the population proved largely indifferent and in some instances hostile to the infiltrators. Memories of the late 1947 tribal invasion from Pakistan still rankled in the Kashmir Valley, when the undisciplined raiders committed numerous atrocities against the fellow Muslims they had ostensibly come to liberate, and Sheikh Abdullah's pro-independence followers were not willing to collude with Pakistani designs. The crisis in Kashmir triggered a twenty-two-day inconclusive war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, not just along the CFL in Kashmir but along the entire international frontier between Pakistan's western wing and India (Bengali-speaking east Pakistan, which emerged as sovereign Bangladesh with Indian support in December 1971, was largely spared the hostilities). Operation Gibraltar was a strategic failure, and the territorial status quo continued." In Lowe, Vaughan (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 335–, ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 167) (Google Scholar Citation Index: 167 "THE SECOND INDIA—PAKISTAN WAR, 1-23 SEPTEMBER 1965 India's humiliating defeat against China in October–November 1962, combined with Nehru's death in May 1964, provided Pakistan with an opportunity to instigate a rebellion in Indian-controlled J&K. It was emboldened by the perceived lack of a vigorous Indian response in the skirmishes between the two countries in the disputed western region of the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965, with UK mediation leading India to accept international arbitration on its future status. Pakistan appeared to believe that as with the Rann of Kutch mediation, a mini-war in Kashmir would result in international mediation which would (in view of Pakistan's belief in the strength of its case) rule in its favour. In early August, in Operation Gilbratar, Pakistan began to infiltrate some 5,000–10,000 armed 'irregulars' and army personnel in disguise into Indian-controlled J&K to bring about a mass uprising against Indian rule. In this context, the UN Chief Military Observer, General Nimmo, noted that 'the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side:" The infiltration was followed on 1 September by an attack on Indian territory in the Chhamb area of Jammu. The Indian response largely involved military operations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and, from 6 September, escalation to a full-scale Indian offensive towards Lahore. After two weeks of bitter land and air warfare, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces reached a military stalemate." Amidst considerable US and UK pressure, including an arms embargo by both on India and Pakistan, both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire." The UN-mandated ceasefire that took effect on 23 September 1965 ended the Second Kashmir War." In Ganguly, Sumit; Scobell, Andrew; Liow, Joseph Chinyong (2009), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, Taylor & Francis, pp. 183–, ISBN 978-1-135-22961-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 16) "On 1 September 1965, after a series of skirmishes along the Ceasefire Line, Pakistani forces attacked Indian territory in the Bhimbar—Chhamb area of Southern Kashmir. The attack set off India and Pakistan's second Kashmir war. The Pakistanis advanced quickly in hopes of capturing Akhnur, which would have enabled them to cut off Indian Kashmir from the rest of the country. India responded by escalating horizontally, driving forces toward Lahore and Sialkot in Pakistan proper, and forcing Pakistan to abandon Akhnur. India's attack on Lahore eventually stalled when its forces reached the irrigation canal just outside the city. A number of inconclusive battles followed, and by the middle of September the war had bogged down in a stalemate. With India facing strong pressure from the international community to desist, and Pakistan failing to receive much-hoped-for assistance from China, the adversaries accepted a UN ceasefire resolution. By the third week of September, the 1965 war was over. Under the post-war settlement, known as the Tashkent Agreement, India and Pakistan agreed to return to the status quo ante, and to forswear the use of force in future disputes." In Moshaver, Ziba (1991), Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 20–21, ISBN 978-1-349-11471-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 66) "By mid-1965, a UN Kashmir observer reported an increase in violations of the cease-fire line by armed men crossing the line into India. On August 15 the Indian PM announced Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir and promised that aggression against India would never be allowed to succeed. Two weeks later, India reported having captured 200 square miles of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan sent forces into Kashmir's southernmost sector, hoping to cut off the rest of Kashmir (called Operation Grand Slam). In early September, Delhi, in turn, sent troops westward across the Punjab towards the Pakistani capital, Lahore. It was only then that Ayub Khan formally declared that Pakistan was at war and asked Washington for help. The US, having become a noticeable supporter of Delhi after its 1962 war with China, declined to support Pakistan and retained its initial policy of not supplying arms to either side of the conflict. The second war over Kashmir lasted no more than three weeks, without either side achieving any decisive victory. ... The 1965 war, however, brought neither a military nor diplomatic victory for either side. Pakistan was blamed for having started the war and India for having extended it into Pakistani territory. In the end it was only Moscow which achieved a diplomatic coup by mediating the Tashkent Declaration. At the invitation of Premier Kosygin, PM Shastri and President Ayub met in Tashkent to negotiate an agreement to end hostilities. On 10 January 1966, one day before Shastri's death, the Tashkent Declaration was signed. As neither party hoped to win, nor wished to resume hostilities, the Declaration was in the nature of a face-saving compromise. In concrete terms its main achievement was that the two sides agreed to withdraw, by 25 February 1966, 'all armed personnel' to the positions along the 1948 cease-fire line. This way the 1948 cease-fire line was again recognized as the de facto international boundary between the two countries. In Ganguly, Šumit (2002), Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, Columbia University Press, pp. 53–, ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 459) "Political developments within Pakistan in the mid-1960s would bring all these disparities and tensions between the two wings of the state to the fore. The problems started almost immediately after the second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. The military stalemate that resulted from the 1965 war proved costly for the Pakistani military regime of President Ayub. Ayub's foreign minister, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, one of the architects of the 1965 war, successfully stoked popular discontent against Ayub in the aftermath of the war. In 1967, Bhutto had formed a political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had a vaguely socialist agenda."

I have now added 20 sources. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:43, 25 March 2019 (UTC) Updated Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:57, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Sources with Google Scholar Citation Index >= 50 in the above list

12 scholarly sources, with Google Scholar Citation Index >= 50, on the outcome of the wars of 1947–48 and 1965

In Nayar, Baldev Raj; Paul, T. V. (2003), India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status, Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–91, ISBN 978-0-521-52875-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 374) In regard to the element of exercising initiative in war-making, Pakistan launched the first violent conflict with India hardly three months after its creation in 1947 through supporting a tribal invasion of Kashmir and then directly participating in the consequent war with India. In the international negotiations at the UN over the war, Pakistan was able to get the support of the UK and the US; even though India retained nearly two-thirds of the state, the issue was not conclusively settled and remained a long-term cause for repeated future conflicts. About two decades later, Pakistan started armed skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in order to test India's will and preparedness, and then induct-ed a massive force of commandos into Kashmir with the purpose of detaching that state from India; in the process, it precipitated the India—Pakistan War of 1965, the result of which was largely a military stalemate." In Chari, P R; Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal; Cohen, Stephen P (2003), Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, Routledge, p. 41, ISBN 978-1-134-39680-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 57) Unlike 1947-8, the 1965 war was a short affair. The UN sponsored ceasefire became effective on September 23, 1965. Although both sides have since claimed victory in 1965, the war actually ended in a stalemate." In Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1991), War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, pp. 8–, ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 450) Similarly, the wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-49 and 1965 had been brought to a stalemate and mediated through international intervention." In Cohen, Stephen P. (2013), Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum, Brookings Institution Press, p. 129, ISBN 978-0-8157-2187-1)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 59) "Their first war was purposeful: Pushtun raiders sent by the NWFP government invaded Kashmir. The incursion was met with an innovative Indian response, resulting in a military stalemate and a series of unsuccessful attempts to negotiate peace. India's encroachment on territory held by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962 was also purposeful, as was Pakistan's probe in Kutch and in Kashmir in 1965, and its 1999 Kargil gambit. Several near-wars were also purposeful: India's Brasstacks exercise was intended to provoke a Pakistani response, which in turn was to have led to a decisive Indian counterattack. One could add to this list India's seizure of the heights of the Siachen Glacier. Most of these operations ended in defeat or disaster." In Rudolph, Lloyd I.; Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber (1987), In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, University of Chicago Press, pp. 133–, ISBN 978-0-226-73139-1(Google Scholar Citation Index: 1143) "Under syndicate leadership, Congress ideology was more than ever perceived as empty rhetoric, mantras without meaning, repeated in manifestos and important party occasions. In Delhi, state capitals, and district towns, the politics of persons and factions crowded aside the politics of national purpose and high policy. The ground was being prepared for the electoral and organizational crises of 1967 and 1969, in the face of two consecutive bad monsoons (1965 and 1966), a draw in a major war with Pakistan (1965), and an unsuccessful devaluation (1966). In the fourth general election of 1967, Congress lost power in eight large states and almost did so nationally; two years later, it split for the first time." In Dittmer, Lowell (2015), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China: India, Pakistan, and China, Routledge, pp. 114–, ISBN 978-1-317-45956-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 50) " In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border incident in the Rann of Kutch, which was resolved in its favor. Emboldened, the Pakistanis authorized Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating troops across the border in hopes of raising up a popular revolt. These efforts failed, and escalated into a more conventional military conflict that ended in stalemate. The net result for Pakistan, however, was particularly poor—it not only failed to accomplish its political aims, but also lost the aid and support of its U.S. ally." In Fortna, Virginia Page (2004), Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace, Princeton University Press, pp. 63–64, ISBN 0-691-11512-5(Google Scholar Citation Index: 439) "THE SECOND KASHMIR WAR, 1965 Infiltrations into Indian-controlled Kashmir by mujahedin increased over the first half of 1965, and in August at least a thousand raiders crossed the cease-fire line from Azad Kashmir. Though Pakistan denied it, by all impartial accounts, Pakistan instigated and coordinated this gue-rilla attack in the hopes of triggering a revolt on whose behalf it could then intervene. The Pakistani plan failed to produce the hoped-for rebellion, however; Kashmiris were increasingly unhappy with Indian rule, but they were not yet interested in armed revolt. India responded to the infiltration by attacking across the cease-fire line to cut off the guerillas. By the beginning of September regular forces from both sides were fighting each other, and on September 6 India attacked across the international border, escalating the war beyond the confines of Kashmir itself. The war quickly reached a military stalemate.There was strong diplomatic pressure for a cease-fire, as the United States and the USSR reached a rare moment of Cold War consensus. The UN called for a cease-fire on September 4 (Resolution 209)" In Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, pp. 44–45, ISBN 978-0-521-76721-7(Google Scholar Citation Index: 73) "Failure to resolve the Kashmir issue led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948. This conflict produced a military stalemate, but when the ground situation appeared to be going against India, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to resolve the political and territorial dispute over Kashmir.' The Security Council decided that the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan must be decided by the Kashmiri people through a plebiscite.' Nehru and subsequent Indian leaders gradually reneged from their promise of a plebiscite (although, to be sure, other UNSC terms also remained unfulfilled), but continued to accept the disputed nature of Kashmir. ... India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir in 1965, the outcome of which was another stalemate." In Bose, Sumantra (2009), Contested Lands, Harvard University Press, pp. 174–, ISBN 978-0-674-02856-2 (Google scholar citation index: 193)(Google Scholar Citation Index: 195) "Stalled at the United Nations and rebuffed by the Indian leadership, the Pakistanis resorted to force to challenge the status quo in Kashmir. Encouraged by a flare-up of unrest with strong anti-Indian overtones in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1963-1964, the Pakistani military regime, headed by the dictator Ayub Khan, formulated an ambitious plan, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, to seize Indian-controlled Kashmir. In August 1965 this plan was put into operation when several thousand Pakistani soldiers and armed volunteers from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir infiltrated the CFL, into Indian-controlled Kashmir with the intention of fomenting a mass uprising. That intention was foiled when the population proved largely indifferent and in some instances hostile to the infiltrators. Memories of the late 1947 tribal invasion from Pakistan still rankled in the Kashmir Valley, when the undisciplined raiders committed numerous atrocities against the fellow Muslims they had ostensibly come to liberate, and Sheikh Abdullah's pro-independence followers were not willing to collude with Pakistani designs. The crisis in Kashmir triggered a twenty-two-day inconclusive war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, not just along the CFL in Kashmir but along the entire international frontier between Pakistan's western wing and India (Bengali-speaking east Pakistan, which emerged as sovereign Bangladesh with Indian support in December 1971, was largely spared the hostilities). Operation Gibraltar was a strategic failure, and the territorial status quo continued." In Lowe, Vaughan (2010), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, Oxford University Press, pp. 335–, ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 167) (Google Scholar Citation Index: 167 "THE SECOND INDIA—PAKISTAN WAR, 1-23 SEPTEMBER 1965 India's humiliating defeat against China in October–November 1962, combined with Nehru's death in May 1964, provided Pakistan with an opportunity to instigate a rebellion in Indian-controlled J&K. It was emboldened by the perceived lack of a vigorous Indian response in the skirmishes between the two countries in the disputed western region of the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965, with UK mediation leading India to accept international arbitration on its future status. Pakistan appeared to believe that as with the Rann of Kutch mediation, a mini-war in Kashmir would result in international mediation which would (in view of Pakistan's belief in the strength of its case) rule in its favour. In early August, in Operation Gilbratar, Pakistan began to infiltrate some 5,000–10,000 armed 'irregulars' and army personnel in disguise into Indian-controlled J&K to bring about a mass uprising against Indian rule. In this context, the UN Chief Military Observer, General Nimmo, noted that 'the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side:" The infiltration was followed on 1 September by an attack on Indian territory in the Chhamb area of Jammu. The Indian response largely involved military operations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and, from 6 September, escalation to a full-scale Indian offensive towards Lahore. After two weeks of bitter land and air warfare, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces reached a military stalemate." Amidst considerable US and UK pressure, including an arms embargo by both on India and Pakistan, both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire." The UN-mandated ceasefire that took effect on 23 September 1965 ended the Second Kashmir War." In Moshaver, Ziba (1991), Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 20–21, ISBN 978-1-349-11471-9(Google Scholar Citation Index: 66) "By mid-1965, a UN Kashmir observer reported an increase in violations of the cease-fire line by armed men crossing the line into India. On August 15 the Indian PM announced Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir and promised that aggression against India would never be allowed to succeed. Two weeks later, India reported having captured 200 square miles of Azad Kashmir. Pakistan sent forces into Kashmir's southernmost sector, hoping to cut off the rest of Kashmir (called Operation Grand Slam). In early September, Delhi, in turn, sent troops westward across the Punjab towards the Pakistani capital, Lahore. It was only then that Ayub Khan formally declared that Pakistan was at war and asked Washington for help. The US, having become a noticeable supporter of Delhi after its 1962 war with China, declined to support Pakistan and retained its initial policy of not supplying arms to either side of the conflict. The second war over Kashmir lasted no more than three weeks, without either side achieving any decisive victory. ... The 1965 war, however, brought neither a military nor diplomatic victory for either side. Pakistan was blamed for having started the war and India for having extended it into Pakistani territory. In the end it was only Moscow which achieved a diplomatic coup by mediating the Tashkent Declaration. At the invitation of Premier Kosygin, PM Shastri and President Ayub met in Tashkent to negotiate an agreement to end hostilities. On 10 January 1966, one day before Shastri's death, the Tashkent Declaration was signed. As neither party hoped to win, nor wished to resume hostilities, the Declaration was in the nature of a face-saving compromise. In concrete terms its main achievement was that the two sides agreed to withdraw, by 25 February 1966, 'all armed personnel' to the positions along the 1948 cease-fire line. This way the 1948 cease-fire line was again recognized as the de facto international boundary between the two countries. In Ganguly, Šumit (2002), Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, Columbia University Press, pp. 53–, ISBN 978-0-231-50740-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 459) "Political developments within Pakistan in the mid-1960s would bring all these disparities and tensions between the two wings of the state to the fore. The problems started almost immediately after the second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. The military stalemate that resulted from the 1965 war proved costly for the Pakistani military regime of President Ayub. Ayub's foreign minister, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, one of the architects of the 1965 war, successfully stoked popular discontent against Ayub in the aftermath of the war. In 1967, Bhutto had formed a political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had a vaguely socialist agenda."

Reduced from first list. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:56, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Discussion

See WP:CHERRYPICKING. You mention Christine Fair, who actually says six decades despite the fact that Pakistan has either lost outright or failed to defeat India in every war they have fought.[1] at Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, p. 31. Aman Goel (talk) 14:54 UTC, March 24, 2019 (UTC)

"Pakistan as experienced in its lost wars with India in 1948, 1965, and 1971." Falling Terrorism and Rising Conflicts: The Afghan "Contribution" to Polarization and Confrontation in West and South Asia, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. -- Aman Goel (talk) 15:00 UTC, March 24, 2019

Failing to defeat India includes instances of stalemate. It does not constitute victory for India or defeat or disaster for Pakistan. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:03, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

Aman, you are doing the cherrypicking here. Its only one source vs many. AshLin (talk) 16:54, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler cites a source that actually says that Paksitan lost all wars or failed to defeat India. That's WP:CHERRYPICKING, to point out only the particular narrative which supports your POV from the same source. 03:37, 25 March 2019 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Aman.kumar.goel (talk • contribs)

I don't think it makes much sense to talk about the "result" of the 1947–48 war. Both India and Pakistan war British dominions, their armed forces were commanded by British officers and London was pulling the strings from behind the scenes. The "result" was as such what London could live with.

As for the 1965 war, there was a long-time consensus that it was a stalemate, but it seems to have been mostly based on the fact that Tashkent Agreement reverted to the status quo ante bellum and neither side was able to claim any advantage. The "fog of war" had lasted for a long time (as it usually does in all Indo-Pakistani conflicts). Nobody even knew what territory was gained or lost by the two sides. But when people drilled down into the details, they definitely saw the advantage India possessed, which it gave up voluntarily. Please see the discussion at Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965#Change in result in the infobox. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:24, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

The best commentary I have seen is this:

Most important, Shastri was honest and above board in peace as he had been in war, projecting India as a powerful but good neighbour instead of the intolerant, unbudgeable centre of the world.

If that is not victory then I don't know what is. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:39, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

References

I'm afraid I can't respond to your interpretations. The sources are clear. Both wars were military stalemates. That is Stephen Cohen's judgment as well. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:49, 24 March 2019 (UTC)

Take a look at WP:RGW, since that is exactly what you are doing. Also read WP:GEVAL. We are not going to create a false balance unless your "sources are clear" that Pakistan won this war. So far sources speak India won, not Pakistan. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 03:41, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Please don't make false allegations about what I am doing. I am a competent editor. I am the major contributor to the India page, as well as the author of its major sections, including history, in its FA runs. I am the major contributor to the Kashmir page. I know what scholarly consensus is, and the fifteen sources adduced above constitute a scholarly consensus that the war ended in a stalemate. Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:48, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Sorry, if I went harsh. But you jumping from one side of argument to other yet staying rigidly on one line enraged me. Nevertheless, discussion can go in any direction, there was a key word "most" and not "all" for the battles involved inside wars. The "stalemate" you are talking about, I mentioned in one of my initial responses. It was "military damage" inflicted on India most certainly and not any other gains.

Your edits on other pages have no bearing on what you are doing here. If we look at your "fifteen" sources, we find enough of them to be about military damage and not actual victory. And finally none say Pakistan won. You need to understand the very basic that failure to achieve the purpose in the war is a defeat. I can write a line India won all wars or Pakistan lost most may be called undiplomatic and biased by you. But you can't put a line Pakistan won most or even Pakistan did not lose most of wars as that would clearly be contradicting sources. I hope you get what I'm trying to say. If the sentence "defeat or disaster" is offensive, there may be a mild sentence not ended up in favour Pakistan. But still it should be there as it provides summary of conflicts to the reader before he goes deep into article. Regards Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 04:02, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

What is it you don't understand. No source is saying the war ended in a Pakistani victory. They are saying that the two wars, of 1947-49 and 1965 ended in a military stalemate. They do not support a judgment of an Indian victory. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 04:07, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

And in fact that is the main point. Sources don't say Pakistan won the war, they say India won the war. Maybe not all of your sources say India won the war but there are tons of academic sources that certainly do, and Wikipedia needs to report that unless same number exists for claiming that Pakistan won the war which they clearly didn't. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 04:14, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

• I have to agree here with Kautilya3 and Aman Goel that sources exists for saying that India won the war and such number of sources are in fact huge in amount..It will depend on the consensus whether we need to include "stalemate" or "Indian victory" but there is no reason to ignore "Indian victory" which is a mainstream academic view of these wars. Current consensus supports Indian victory and a new consensus cannot be formed without an RFC. Sdmarathe (talk) 03:51, 25 March 2019 (UTC)
• If the scholarly sources are "huge in amount," then it should be no problem finding them. Thus far there are only two or three scholarly ones (ie academic presses) that suggest this. I already have 15 above. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:55, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

  While I agree with you that a majority of academic sources do agree that the 1965 war was a stalemate, I have to call out a few bad sources in your list. The ninth source by Weeks, Jessica L. P. makes the exceptional claim that India initiated both 1947 and 1965 wars. This is so far out of the mainstream opinion that I'd have to discount the source itself as POV for making that claim. The eleventh source can be shown as supporting either side of the argument by highlighting particular sentences. The same applies to the fifteenth source too.

  A binary discussion about Indian victory/stalemate seems reductive, as a sizeable minority of sources declare Indian victory. Even among the majority declaring stalemate, many sources attribute an upper hand to India in one way or the other. Anyway, this discussion about 1965 war should really be happening on Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 page, considering its higher visibility and that the last consensus was reached there. —Gazoth (talk) 04:55, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

@Gazoth: This is not a binary discussion; only one adduced for whether the sentence "Most wars ended in defeat or disaster for Pakistan." which had been added to this page's lead, but removed later, can be re-introduced. You are incorrectly using the word "many sources attribute an upper hand." In the 15 sources I have presented only four (4)—numbers 10, 11, 12, and 15—mention anything more than a straightforward stalemate. The other page has a separate issue. It has a "Military conflict infobox." If the war has ended in a military stalemate, that is what we enter. If there is dispute among the sources, then we simply add "inconclusive." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:45, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler&fowler, since you disputed the infobox result and linked this discussion from 1965 war page, the origin of the discussion does not matter. As for only four sources supporting an Indian upper hand, it is only four among the parts that you quoted. For example, in Fighting to the End, Fair writes

On September 20, 1965, with the war rapidly approaching a stalemate, the UNSC passed a resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities. India conceded, but on political, not military, grounds: it could have sustained the conflict and turned the stalemate into an outright victory (Raghavan 2009). Pakistan was even more willing to settle: military setbacks had cost Ayub his will to continue fighting (Ganguly 2001; Nawaz 2008a).

Plenty of the sources that you quoted don't dedicate more than a few sentences to the 1965 war, and two (8 and 9) don't even have a full sentence on it. It is unreasonable to compare them on equal grounds with the rest. —Gazoth (talk) 07:06, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

@Gazoth: Sources which devote no more than a few sentences are more relevant to a discussion whose object is to consider the ultimate in due weight in the form of one "outcome," "victory or defeat." Monographs or journal articles on the 1965 war will by their very nature make either more complex judgments or more limited judgments, depending on their own focus. See WP:SCHOLARSHIP which says, "Avoid undue weight when using single studies in such fields. ... Secondary sources, such as meta-analyses, textbooks, and scholarly review articles are preferred when available, so as to provide proper context." A book, such as my reference 8, by Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph (Google Scholar citation index 1140), which declares the war to be a draw, in one sentence, or my reference number 5, (Google scholar citation index 450) which is similarly brief, the considerations of weight are made by the authors, and vetted by the review process to which such books are subjected. In contrast, a single study, such as my 15 the reference (Google scholar citation index 21) is less reliable for issues of weight. The later references which you mention have been deliberately added by me to show the full range of the non-military, i.e. political and strategic, advantages at the end of the war. Contrast that with the sources used in the Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 RfC, as evidence of an undisputed Indian victory. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:47, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

• Hi @Fowler - Since your only issue is that we can't find sources for supporting Indian victory then you must read Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965#Change in result in the infobox as already linked above by Kautilya3 on 17:24, 24 March 2019. More than a dozen high-quality source had been provided there which supports either Indian victory or decisive Indian victory. Like I said, there is no reason to omit that. Additionally the sources you cited even though list the war as ending in stalemate merely state so because both sides retreated to their earlier positions. That does not always mean one side did or did not win the war - just that both sides retreated because of Tashkent accord to maintain peace. Sdmarathe (talk) 04:19, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

I have already looked at those sources. Their are six. Kux doesn't count as he is not making the claim of an Indian military victory. It is "Infobox military conflict" after all, so victory means military victory. Your sources are not particularly weighty. Their Google Scholar citation indices are lower than most of my sources. Here are a few Van Praagh: Greater Game. Citation Index 16, McGarr: Cold War in South Asia. Citation index 49; Conley: Indo-Russian military .... Citation index 28; Haggerty: South Asia in World Politics. Citation index 50. Contrast them with the citation indices of some of my sources which state that the war ended in a stalemate. Nayar: India in the World Order. CI 374; Sisson: War and Secession. CI 450; Rudolph and Rudolph: In search of Lakshmi. CI 1140; and so forth. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:29, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

• This contention about an Indian military victory is not at all true. The 1965 war was not a military victory for India, at most we can say that India had an advantageous position at the time of its conclusion. And while I do understand that this is not "evidence" as understood by WP, I have been the Director of the Corps of Engineers Archives & Museum in CME, Pune for almost 7 years and have domain knowledge not just because I was a military man but was a military historian too. This is a faux nationalist POV bashing by a few editors and does India's military history and the interests of this encyclopedia no good. AshLin (talk) 05:41, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

• I am from Pakistan and I can assure you that Fowler&fowler is lying and deceiving. Pakistan thought that it is gonna win the war with funding from UK and the US but it had to beg India for the ceasefire and India returned the land it won during the war. This was such a humiliating defeat for Pakistan that Pakistan never "directly" fought India or ever thought about invading India with military. Next war of 1971 happened only when Pakistanis started engaging in genocide of Bangladesh and Indians saved them. To say this was a "stalemate" is erroneous and POV pushing. 39.42.10.113 (talk) 15:56, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

• More sources supporting Indian victory in 1965 war:

1. ""trends accelerated after "Pakistan's defeat in 1965"[2]
2. "India defeated Pakistan in 1965"[3]
3. "The two fought again in 1965 and in 1971 and Pakistan lost both wars"[4]
4. "India's victorious success in the 1965 war"[5]
5. "A three-week war in 1965 resulted in an Indian victory."[6]
6. "Pakistan as experienced in its lost wars with India in 1948, 1965, and 1971" [7]
7. "In South Asia, Pakistan lost the 1965 war with India."[8]
8. "Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which saw the largest tank-battle since the Second World War, was a strategic win for India"[9]
9. "in its 1965 war... India defeated Pakistan again".[10]
10. "Pakistan experienced defeat by India in war over Kashmir immediately after independence in 1947, again in 1965"[11]
11. "This was proved during the 1965 Indo-Pak war when India defeated Pakistan comprehensively."[12]
12. "Pakistanis who had relied on their armoured superiority to defeat the Indian Army but, in turn, were defeated."[13]
13. "1965: India defeated Pakistan"[14]
14. "In 1965, a war erupted between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Although India won this war" [15]
15. "during the war of 1965, in which India defeated Pakistan in twenty-one days".[16]
16. "India defeated Pakistan in 1965"[17]
17. "on September 23, just seventeen days after the war began, Pakistan was defeated."[18]
18. "India's relative victory in two Indo-Pakistan wars on Kashmir in 1948 and 1965"[19]
19. "lost face with his defeat in 1965"[20]
20. "Pakistan attempted the 1965 aggression. The domestic unrest was aggravated and so did antipathy towards India after they lost in 1965 war."[21]
21. "Pakistan's defeat in 1965 finally contributed to the secession of 1971"[22]

Above high-quality reliable sources easily outnumber the sources from Fowler, many of which Fowler appears to have misunderstood as pointed by Gazoth. Now including the sources that we see on Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965#Change in result in the infobox, most of which are very great in quality, we clearly have more than enough reliable sources to establish Indian victory as the outcome of 1965 war. This dispute started after Fowler reverted Gotitbro who had restored the sourced content.[23]

Also take a look at: Nitin A Gokhale. 1965 Turning the Tide. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 224. ISBN 9789386141217. This book has analysed the arguments about the conclusion of the war and said that "there is only one conclusion: India won the war."

Now unless Fowler can find such sources that fulfill WP:CONTEXTMATTERS and/or offer opposite views such as "Pakistani victory", I see no reason to keep debating about this. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 16:57, 25 March 2019 (UTC)

I have now created a reduced list of sources with Google Scholar Citation Index greater than or equal to 50. Please see Talk:Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts#Sources_with_Google_Scholar_Citation_Index_>=_50_in_the_above_list. Please note WP:SCHOLARSHIP, which states, " One can confirm that discussion of the source has entered mainstream academic discourse by checking the scholarly citations it has received in citation indexes. A corollary is that journals not included in a citation index, especially in fields well covered by such indexes, should be used with caution, though whether it is appropriate to use will depend on the context." In a few minutes, I will present the citation index of the sources presented by @Aman.kumar.goel:. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:09, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Listed below are the Google Scholar Citation Index for sources above compiled by @Aman.kumar.goel:. These are very poor quality sources. Several have no citation index; several others have CI in single digits; there are technical reports lists, not actual refereed publications. There are several book chapters that are not listed as book chapters. All in all there are only three source with CI >= 50. The Nitin Gokhale book does not appear in the Citation Index.

Google Scholar Citation Index for the list of Aman kumar goel

""trends accelerated after "Pakistan's defeat in 1965"[24] This is an edited book. The correct citation is S. Walt: Alliance formation in Southwest Asia (chapter)... in Dominoes and Bandwagons ...(Google Scholar Citation Index:38 ) "India defeated Pakistan in 1965"[25] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 9) "The two fought again in 1965 and in 1971 and Pakistan lost both wars"[26] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 50) "India's victorious success in the 1965 war"[27] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 44) "A three-week war in 1965 resulted in an Indian victory."[28] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 23) "Pakistan as experienced in its lost wars with India in 1948, 1965, and 1971" [29] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 15) "In South Asia, Pakistan lost the 1965 war with India."[30] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 35) "Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which saw the largest tank-battle since the Second World War, was a strategic win for India"[31] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 0) "in its 1965 war... India defeated Pakistan again".[32] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 3) "Pakistan experienced defeat by India in war over Kashmir immediately after independence in 1947, again in 1965"[33] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 13) "This was proved during the 1965 Indo-Pak war when India defeated Pakistan comprehensively."[34] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 7) "Pakistanis who had relied on their armoured superiority to defeat the Indian Army but, in turn, were defeated."[35] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 6 "1965: India defeated Pakistan"[36] (This is "Illustrated History of Women, volume 10, which is not cited in Google Scholar.) "In 1965, a war erupted between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Although India won this war" [37] (Google Scholar Citation Index 18) "during the war of 1965, in which India defeated Pakistan in twenty-one days".[38] (Google Scholar Citation Index: Not cited ) "India defeated Pakistan in 1965"[39] (Google Scholar Citation Index: Not cited "on September 23, just seventeen days after the war began, Pakistan was defeated."[40] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 55) "India's relative victory in two Indo-Pakistan wars on Kashmir in 1948 and 1965"[41] This a book chapter: Kishore C. Dash, Dynamics of South Asian Regionalism. (Google Scholar Citation Index: 6) "lost face with his defeat in 1965"[42] Another book chapter: Dietmar Rothermund: "The USA and India: Mutual perceptions of political actions." (Google Scholar Citation Index: Not cited) "Pakistan attempted the 1965 aggression. The domestic unrest was aggravated and so did antipathy towards India after they lost in 1965 war."[43] This is Satish Kumar's India's National Security: Annual Review 2010 which is not cited. The annual review 2014 is cited and has Google Scholar Citation Index 12 "Pakistan's defeat in 1965 finally contributed to the secession of 1971"[44] (Google Scholar Citation Index: 125)

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:20, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

So, the entire debate has been circular and back to the point we had two sections ago. Please don't open another section now.

* There has been open showcasing of POV and narrative pushing. The summarizing sentence initially was removed for using "unencylopedic" language and was restored as neutrality and not "diplomatic narration" is Wikipedia's policy. Edit warring was started creating the row here and the perpetrating member has been jumping from one side to other side of argument continuously (See: WP:CONTEXTMATTERS). The sources which were put in another article after a complete consensus were tagged as "dubious" without offering any contradiction to the outcome of the war. After switching aspects, there was an irrelevant complaint of "not enough Pakistani members being here". The member however outrightly rejects my allegations. The nature of set of actions involved make it perfectly consistent with WP:IDONTLIKEIT. For the other article, consensus was made when a fairl number of Pakistani members were involved. I, however maintain my position to restore the summarizing sentence with more encyclopaedic language if not as it is, citing clear sources, describing sources provided by others and explaining changing aspects/contexts from "diplomatic language", literal framing of sentence, number of sources cited, changing the contexts and providing quality sources where I have got lead the argument one by one. The latest one is about scholar index which I'm yet to explain. I can't use my original research as per rules. Nevertheless, I have continuously being contradicting misinterpretations. Hence, I also reject allegations on me and fellow members by @Fowler&fowler: for PoV pushing what we haven't been doing since start but he has been doing by WP:CHERRYPICKING and misinterpreting the sources.

* There was a keyword most and not all, the argument enough to settle down the discussion. The statement India won most wars is accepted and cited by dozens of sources on this talk page while Pakistan won most of wars or even Pakistan did not lose of most wars isn't even summary of a neutral observer (ignored in this discussion). India and Pakistan had three official wars and multiple unofficial conflicts where India has secured the outcome completely or incompletely in its favour. Hence, even if the one is led to believe that any one or two of conflicts was stalemate, the line most of these wars should be perfectly consistent for him if he's being neutral.

* WP:CONTEXTMATTERS is most important here as the particular member is not only misinterpreting losses context as military context and pushing this irrelevant context wrongfully ahead of purpose context in Second Kashmir War but unknowingly or deliberately ignoring the same in First Kashmir war.

* I will vote First Kashmir War as stalemate despite the fact that India was having upper hand militarily by a very large margin as purpose of both countries were not achieved completely and ended up dividing the land. My agreement on this is not enough yet to reject Pakistan lost most wars because 1947-48 war wasn't only one. It was followed by 1965, 1971, Siachen Conflict and Kargil War.

* 1965 War was purposeful and informally (Kashmir infiltration) & formally initiated by Pakistan with Operation Gibraltar. The conflict ended with UN intervention when both countries had nearly same number of losses with India having slightly upper hand. But it ended up at a time when attack on Kashmir was already thwarted and India was advancing inside Pakistan, capturing a large chunk of their territory. Moreover, there has already been a source above mentioning that India was going to turn the losses gap wide and military superiority if war continued. As the Pakistan didn't achieve what it wanted at all, incurred heavy military losses and defeated politically & diplomatically, war can't be termed as stalemate. Gap in losses is not a correct and actually irrelevant when you are assessing the result of war. By applying this, First Kashmir will be a clear Indian Victory which in fact had limited success. The result of war is judged by its outcome. It's not necessary that everything should have grey shades. Some things are either black or white only and multiple perspectives aren't involved there. So, is the victory in an expeditionary war.

* Not much relevant to our discussion but it may help to judge the source itself:

Montgomery, Evan Braden (2016), In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Cornell University Press, pp. 112–113, ISBN 978-1-5017-0400-0(Google Scholar Citation Index: 12)

"Second, despite the considerable relative power advantage that India seemed to enjoy on paper, it soon became apparent that New Delhi was not going to emerge as a local hegemon that could dominate South Asia, if it managed to achieve a victory at all. Rather, the Second Kashmir War demonstrated to U.S. officials that India would remain preoccupied with Pakistan because it was not yet strong enough to break free of the balance of power on the subcontinent. In short, the hegemonic power shift that was taking place was incomplete. This, in turn, forced Washington to revise its earlier assessments and reconsider its regional strategy.

The above narrative of "containing Indian hegemony" belongs solely to Pakistani intellectuals, scholars and political scientists. Islamic Republic of Pakistan sees itself as a balance of India in Indian Subcontinent meanwhile Republic of India who alone comprises 74% of population, 76% of landmass and 80% of economy of region has its concerns and sphere of militray capabilities and assets spread around the entire Indian Ocean Region while narrative among Indian Scholars is to establish India as a great power. The narrative often runs among Indian defence enthusiasts and scholars to "ignore and dehyphenate" Pakistan till Pakistan makes it impossible for India to ignore it. To find if writer on Indian Ocean Region contexts is Indian/Pakistani/some foreigner with bias towards either of them, you just may check the narratives to judge. Here is a Pakistani analyst on Indian foreign policy that may help you to understand. "Difficult Equation". The Dawn. October 9, 2019. Retrieved March 27, 2019.

* While you were busy changing "narrative" in the article, you said Balakot adventure was a retaliation of Pulwama episode. Yesterday in an interview, India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval denied and said that strikes were pre planned and Pulwama's retribution has not been attained yet. So its better if the "retaliation" is removed from the article.

* In the end, I understand that Most of these wars have ended up with defeat or disaster for Pakistan may sound offensive or biased. The sentence may be replaced with milder version not ended up with favour of Pakistan but not removal at all. It puts the summary of history of conflicts beforehand. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 10:05, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

Proposal

I think Fowler&fowler's compilation of sources shows that the scholarly consensus still prefers "stalemate" as the result of the 1965 war. So I propose that the 1965 war page be reverted to what it was before this edit, and this page modified accordingly. I also think the sentiment expressed in this scholarly view

Most important, Shastri was honest and above board in peace as he had been in war, projecting India as a powerful but good neighbour instead of the intolerant, unbudgeable centre of the world.

should be respected. The contrary views expressed by other scholars can also be summarised in the body, but not unduly. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:21, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

But there are dozens of sources that more accurately support Indian victory in the war. Any discussion about changing the outcome must be initiated at Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. I would recommend initiating WP:RFC as there are enough citations for supporting either parameter. Not this page. Orientls (talk) 08:40, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

The previous change was made by local consensus, not an RfC. So I am not sure why we need an RfC now. Since the discussion is taking place here, it would be best to conclude it here as well. I will make a post there inviting comments. As for sources, yes, there are dozens of sources for both the results. I am asking editors to review all of them to the extent of their ability and interest, and provide their input. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:40, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

I would support the following words in the infobox outcome, which is in keeping with @AshLin:'s assessment: "Military stalemate (with India possessing a military advantage at the time of conclusion, and somewhat greater political advantage)." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:13, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Pakistan lost the war and started engaging in proxy terrorism against India after seeing humiliating defeat in 1965.[45] Don't censor this. 39.42.89.236 (talk) 16:20, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

I would support this wording too. —Gazoth (talk) 15:53, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Fowler's references fail WP:CONTEXTMATTERS unlike few I provided right above as well as all those provided at Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965#Change in result in the infobox, which are of great quality.

Analysis of Fowler&fowler's sources by Aman.kumar.goel

Ref 1 & 3 are both books on different subjects and have one line passing mentions; both books are not remotely focused on the Indo-Pak wars Same with ref 4; barely one line passing mention of the war; chapter being on Pakistani politics. Same with ref 5; one line passing mention in a book not remotely focused on the subject at hand. Ref 6 is the same book by Cohen; it's being badly misrepresented as nowhere it describes the 1965 war as a stalemate; it in fact says: "People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962 was also purposeful, as was Pakistan's probe in Kutch and in Kashmir in 1965...Most of these operations ended in defeat or disaster." Ref 7, again, is a book on an unrelated subject: the political economy of India, and hardly has a one line passing mention. This is also not a good quality source. Ref 8 is a book on regional powers and the quote provided reads: "With neither side able to achieve a decisive victory, senior U.S. officials began to take a much darker view of the region as a whole and India's prospects as a rising power". Ref 9 hardly has a single paragraph on the war and thus won't pass muster. In that one paragraph, it also emphasizes that the net result for Pakistan was poor. Ref 10, again is a book on a different subject not remotely related to the 1965 war and hardly contains two lines on the war; in fact the 1965 war is listed among other wars in a single page and the source is basically providing brief list of all the Indo Pak wars.

I will analyze more when I get time but so far Fowler's sources have failed WP:CONTEXTMATTERS and they are being misrepresented. Interpreting what the source says as 'stalemate' is a clear misrepresentation. There are many reliable sources out there that says the same thing but nonetheless notes that India was a clear victor in the war, if not decisive clearly won the war, if not decisively*. This is something that was mentioned in the discussion at the main article's talk page as well. I am opposing this proposal. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 16:31, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Here are four sources, authored by political scientists, which speak to the nuances implicit in my proposal above, the first three giving a sense of the political or psychological advantage garnered by India and the last offering a binary (or really tri-nary) result. In this last reference, some editors might be surprised by India being listed as the "initiator" in both Kashmir wars, but I suspect this is because the authors do not consider infiltration to constitute initiating, especially in a disputed region, i.e. Kashmir, only crossing the international border (airlifting Indian troops to Kashmir in 1947), or crossing the international border into Punjab in 1965. Regardless, this is a highly cited source, as you will see, and makes the one-word judgment of Win/lose/draw.

Four sources speaking to the war's outcome

In Hewitt, Vernon (1997), The New International Politics of South Asia: Second Edition, Manchester University Press, pp. 44–, ISBN 978-0-7190-5122-7 (Google Scholar Citation Index: 51) "Indian mistrust was further reinforced in 1965, following a second clash with Pakistan, with Kashmir once more at the centre of the dispute. India's military humiliation over the 1962 border clash with China (discussed below) had revealed serious weaknesses in India's military capability. In early April 1965 the Pakistan army carried out a careful probe of India's defences in the Rann of Kutch area, adjacent to the Indian state of Gujarat and Rajasthan. Satisfied that Indian morale was low, Ayub Khan launched the infamous Operation Gibraltar to take Kashmir by force. The result of the conflict was another draw that failed to alter the already existing UN ceasefire line. To Pakistan's surprise, India launched an attack across the international Punjabi border, and the key Pakistani assumption — that Muslim Kashmiris would welcome the Pakistanis as liberators — badly misfired. The stalemate was made official through the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966 signed in Soviet Central Asia, which reinstated the status quo ante". In Swami, Praveen (2006), India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, Routledge, pp. 79–, ISBN 978-1-134-13752-7Google Scholar Citation Index: 157 "Although the war of 1965 had, in purely military terms, ended in a stalemate, its true meaning soon began to become evident to Pakistan's people. India now flatly asserted that the status of Jammu and Kashmir was non-negotiable. It was, quite clearly, unwilling to concede in peace what Pakistan had not been able to wrest through war. If, in 1947-1948, Pakistan had succeeded in winning a third of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir it was to come away from the 1965 conflict with nothing. Worse, from Pakistan's point of view, it had become clear that the alliances it had built over the past decade-and-a-half were of little practical value. China was unwilling to intercede militarily; the United States, for its part, had responded to the outbreak of hostilities by imposing an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. In Dixit, J. N. (2003), India-Pakistan in War and Peace, Routledge, pp. 140–, ISBN 978-1-134-40758-3Google Scholar Citation Index: 179 "Though India claimed victory in the 1965 war, in purely operational and military terms it was a draw with no decisive military victory for either side. It was in politico-strategic terms and policy objectives that Pakistan was defeated. It was an incontrovertible fact that Pakistan initiated the conflict by organising first the massive tribal infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir under the covert invasion titled "Operation Gibraltar", and when it failed, deployed its regular army ..." In Reiter, Dan; Stam, Allan C. (2010), Democracies at War, Princeton University Press, pp. 56–, ISBN 1-4008-2445-1Google Scholar Citation Index: 1092 " War                                Participant        Initiator/Target        Outcome First Kashmir 1947–48      India                    Initiator                    Draw First Kashmir 1947–48      Pakistan              Target                    Draw Sino-Indian, 1962              China                    Initiator                    Win Sino-Indian, 1962              India                    Target                    Lose Second Kashmir 1965      India                    Initiator                    Draw Second Kashmir 1965      Pakistan              Target                    Draw Bangladesh, 1971              India                    Initiator                    Win Bangladesh, 1971              Pakistan              Target                    Lose "

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 21:02, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

Well, the thing that you don't understand is that it doesn't matter whether a source is highly cited or not, but whether it's reliable for a particular claim, which is determined by WP:CONTEXTMATTERS. Your last source is a perfect example of why we don't rely on such sources which discuss a subject only in passing, and why we have policies like the one I just mentioned. Now, I won't even go telling how preposterous your justification is for using such a source peddling fringe theories in passing, because I don't need to. The policy is clear on this. Orientls (talk) 06:25, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

• More analysis:

Ref 12 is a book on cease-fire agreements in general by a political science professor (not a military historian!) and of the total 243 pages, it barely has a single page on 1965 war. Clearly not a high quality sources of the likes of which were presented during the discussion at the main article's talk page. Furthermore, this source too is being misrepresented as it only says that the "war quickly reached a military stalemate", not that it ended in a military stalemate (those are two different things), and then goes to say that "Pakistan was beginning to run out of ammunition, and could see that the war would turn to favor India over the long haul."

Ref 11 has a single paragraph each on the 1965 and other wars. Hardly a quality source for the claim that war ended in a military stalemate, because it doesn't analyzes the war comprehensively like sources cited at the main article's talk page. Just a single paragraph, basically it's just providing a brief summary of each wars -- the likes of which, like I showed, exists in numbers for the claim that India won the war decisively too.

Ref 13, again, is a handbook on Asian Security and the cited page hardly has a single paragraph on the 1965 war. Yet another source making passing mention. This won't pass muster, like others.

Ref 14 is a book solely dedicated to the Kargil conflict; it is not a reliable source for anything related to the 1965 war, about which it contains just a single sentence anyway "India and Pakistan fought their second war over Kashmir in 1965, the outcome of which was another stalemate". Enough said.

Fowler cites a reference (vide, "In Dixit, J. N. (2003), India-Pakistan in War and Peace") that despite saying that there was "no decisive military victory for either side" concurs that strategically India emerged victorious in the war.

More on this; vide, "In Hewitt, Vernon (1997), The New International Politics of South Asia: Second Edition": it's not a quality reliable source for the claim made either, because it devotes just a single paragraph on the entire war. Easily fails the relevant RS policy.

To say that such sources outweigh the ones which do comprehensively cover the war in dozens of pages is just pointless. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 10:05, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

@Orientls: Please do explain how two authors who are leaders in the field of Democratic peace theory, have written a book cited by 1,100 scholarly articles in Google Scholar, whose paradigmatic example illustrating their work in the book, along with the Second World War, is the India-Pakistan war of 1971, and in turn whose five page discussion on pages 33 to 38, they begin with,

quote from the book Democracies at War

"We demonstrate and illustrate these points by briefly examining two wars, the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and the Pacific War between Japan and the United States during World War II. In each case, as our theory would lead us to expect, understanding the origins of the war is centrally important to explaining its outcome. India-Pakistan War, 1971 India exploited the advantages of democracy in its 1971 war with Pakistan. Since decolonization in 1947, the two wings of Pakistan, West and East Pakistan, had united under the common bond of Islam to comprise one nation. However, political power had always fallen into the hands of the West Pakistanis, and the relationship between West Pakistan and East Pakistan was paternalistic at best. These facts, coupled with the gross economic disparities that existed between the two wings, prompted an East Pakistani movement for regional autonomy beginning in 1965. In 1971 the political conflict reached a head. A national election held in December 1970 gave the majority of seats in the Pakistani National As-sembly to a single East Pakistani party, stunning the West Pakistanis. ...

who, in addition, mention wars relating to India and Pakistan on a dozen other pages—do not fit the context. Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:12, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

@Aman.kumar.goel: In light of your critique above, "Ref 7, again, is a book on an unrelated subject: the political economy of India, and hardly has a one line passing mention. This is also not a good quality source." please explain how Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, the authors of Ref 7, whose book is cited by 1,143 scholarly articles, also don't fit the context when the describe the 1965 war variously on several pages as a draw, a military failure, or disappointment for India, but call the 1971 war a victory for India.

Quotes from Rudolph and Rudolph's In pursuit of Lakshmi

"The ground was being prepared for the electoral and organizational crises of 1967 and 1969, in the face of two consecutive bad monsoons (1965 and 1966), a draw in a major war with Pakistan (1965), and an unsuccessful devaluation (1966). In the fourth general election of 1967, Congress lost power ... (page 133)" "Congress's loss of support and the marked (5 percent) increase in turnout in 1967 (see fig. 4) reflected voter dissatisfaction with poor economic and military performance in the preceding two years ' The depressing economic consequences of two consecutive bad monsoons, disappointment with the outcome of the 1965 war with Pakistan, and the unsuccessful devaluation of June 1966 were blamed on the Congress government. (page 161)" "Demand politics surfaced in 1964-65 and continued through 1974-75, with a brief remission in 1971-72. Exogenous factors contributed to this change; these included shocks caused by security, political, and economic events: military failure in wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965); the deaths of two prime ministers (Nehru in May 1964 and Shastri in January 1966); and the "worst weather on record" (page 228) " In a 1972 khaki election for state assemblies held soon after India's military victory over Pakistan in December 1971, the electorate not only confirmed its 1971 judgment but also re-warded Mrs. Gandhi's conduct of the war by returning Congress majorities in most states. (page 239)

Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:47, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

@Aman.kumar.goel: Please compress your two lengthy replies involving sources (above) in the manner I have done with the template "compress top/bottom"). It becomes very difficult to keep track of this thread for other interested users. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:53, 27 March 2019 (UTC)

References

I've already explained it, and so have other people here. As with other references you posted, this book's theme too is nowhere related to the military history of India, let alone the war of 1965 between India and Pakistan. As its title and description reads, it focuses on the subject of India's political economy. I cannot help you if you want to keep pretending otherwise. There is nothing substantial whatsoever in the book with regards to the war of 1965 apart from the hardly-one-line passing mention. Heck, that mention too is in the context of the events leading up to the Congress's poor electoral performance in the late 1960s in general and the fourth general elections in 1967 in particular, of which events such as  China's attack in 1962, the 1965 war with Pakistan, the droughts in 1965 and in 1966 played a crucial role in undermining the congres system in that period -- all of these thus expectedly had mentions in that book. If you think the book gives us anything substantial about the war in particular, you need to show where by linking to the particular page(s). The sources I provided and a few of yours as well in fact confirm that both sides had some losses and wars end up with ceasefire one day but this war involved a victory and a defeat. Per WP:NPOV and WP:RS we can't omit this necessary part. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 17:41, 28 March 2019 (UTC)

@Aman.kumar.goel: Could you please explain how the following randomly selected five references from your list, especially the last, Illustrated History of Women, volume 10, belong to the military history of India, which you have just stated is the sine qua non of a WP:RS and WP:NPOV for this page:

• 4. "India's victorious success in the 1965 war" in Foreign Policy of India, 7th edition, Vikas Publications, Delhi (Google Scholar Citation Index: 44) Author: V N Khanna Formerly Reader in Political Science, Deshbandhu College University of Delhi
• 5. "A three-week war in 1965 resulted in an Indian victory." The Genocide Debate: Politicians, Academics, and Victims (Google Scholar Citation Index: 23) Author: Donald W. Beachler, Associate Professor, Department of Politics, Ithaca College, New York.
• 7. "In South Asia, Pakistan lost the 1965 war with India." The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward India Since Independence (Google Scholar Citation Index: 35) Author: M. SRINIVAS CHARY is Adjunct Professor at the New School of Social Research in New York.
• 11. "This was proved during the 1965 Indo-Pak war when India defeated Pakistan comprehensively."India and the Dynamics of World Politics: A book on Indian Foreign Policy Pearson Education, Delhi (Google Scholar Citation Index: 7) Author: Reetika Sharma has been involved in free lance writing on the implications of recent policy initiatives on related social, political, and economics spheres. She has been associated with reputed institutes guiding students for civil services exams contributed significantly to the success of many candidates. (From back cover of book.)
• 13. "1965: India defeated Pakistan"Illustrated History of Women, Volume 10 (Google Scholar Citation Index 0)

Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:41, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

Sources I provided were aimed to count if your "15 sources" can be outnumbered and it was not even difficult. We are clear now that enough sources agree that India won the war. When we discuss the qualified sources for discussing the results then Talk:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965#Change in result in the infobox already had enough quality sources that we didn't needed another discussion. You are beating a dead horse unless you can provide sources which surpass that great quality of sources. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 05:36, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

@Aman.kumar.goel: You say, "the sources were aimed to count if your '15 sources' can be outnumbered." Could you please clarify what this means, which Wikipedia guideline (from WP:POLICYLIST) recommends it, and what relation this bears to military history, which I failed to comprehend in my brief career as a military history reviewer? What Wikipedia principle of congruence balances Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph's magnum opus with a book whose author is described on its back cover as, "--- has been involved in free lance writing on the implications of recent policy initiatives on related social, political, and economics spheres. She has been associated with reputed institutes guiding students for civil services exams contributed significantly to the success of many candidate.?" Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 09:09, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

Why you are collapsing my analysis of your sources. As a matter of policy, you shouldn't be doing that without my consent per WP:REFACTOR; and the comments aren't as long as you pretend anyway. You seem to be intransigent as far as your sources are concerned, which doesn't really help. We don't normally use sources which provide information about a subject, which isn't related to the principal topics of the source, in passing. Most of your sources fall in that category as shown above. It's incumbent on you to look at what context the source is making that particular statement about that subject. That's even more the case when the thing being argued upon is a result of an India-Pakistan war. Again, this is accepted widely as a matter of policy. Wikilawyering doesn't help either. As with any other article on a major war, there is no dearth of in-depth analysis of the war in reliable sources, as also evidenced by the laundry list of such sources in use for the current result in the article. Aman.kumar.goel (talk) 16:18, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

@Aman.kumar.goel: I have uncollapsed your analysis. Please accept my sincere apologies. However, let us stick to Military History. Again, you say, "the sources were aimed to count if your '15 sources' can be outnumbered." Could you please clarify what this means, which Wikipedia guideline (from WP:POLICYLIST) recommends it, and what relation this bears to military history, one which I failed to comprehend in my brief career as a military history reviewer? What Wikipedia principle of congruence balances Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph's magnum opus with 1143 Google Scholar citations with a book, with 7 Google Scholar citations, whose author is described on its back cover as, "--- has been involved in free lance writing on the implications of recent policy initiatives on related social, political, and economics spheres. She has been associated with reputed institutes guiding students for civil services exams contributed significantly to the success of many candidate.?" Please no WP:Weasel answers. Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:45, 29 March 2019 (UTC)

First, sorry for replying late as I'm running too busy at office. Second, I have actually quoted many high quality sources which includes dedicated analysts who have spent their careers studying Indo Pakistani conflicts to institutions like Oxford University, Colombia University, Routledge. Now, we both rush to outnumber each others' sources and start to bring political scientists here after military historians, I don't think its going to help discussion in any way. I cited WP:CONTEXTMATTERS for a very good reason. The sources you quoted assert stalemate were all suggesting Military stalemate on the basis of close & heavy losses on both sides. Pakistan didn't get its purpose served in any way. There is no single source that unambiguously can state that Pakistan won the war or there was any stalemate except the context of extent of losses. 1965 war had a purpose for Pakistan and blocking the same purpose was the aim of India. I find no way to call it stalemate while it stopped after UN intervention during Indian expedition. 11:06, 31 March 2019 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Aman.kumar.goel (talk • contribs)

Break

Dear @Aman.kumar.goel:, No problem. Since you seem to be giving pride of place to military history, a field with its own methodology, can you name people in your list who are professional military historians, with an academic appointment as a professor of military history at a reputable institution? For none of the authors in the list so kindly supplied by @Sdmarathe: are military historians:

However, I do know of the work of Daniel Marston, Professor of Military History, Australian National University, and formerly Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair in the Art of War at the US Army Command and General Staff College., and author of many books on military history:

Books on military history authored by Daniel Marston

Marston, Daniel (2014), The Indian Army and the End of the Raj, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-89975-8, Marston, Daniel (2013), The Seven Years' War, Routledge, ISBN 978-1-135-97517-3, Marston, Daniel (2014), The French-Indian War 1754–1760, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 978-1-4728-1010-6, Marston, Daniel; Malkasian, Carter (2011), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 978-1-84908-652-3, Marston, Daniel (2007), The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, Bloomsbury USA, ISBN 978-1-84603-212-7, Marston, Daniel (2014), The American Revolution 1774–1783, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 978-1-4728-1011-3, Marston, Daniel (2003), Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign, Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 978-0-275-98003-0,

, but most of all: Marston, Daniel; Sundaram, Chandar S. (2008), A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era, Indiana University Press, ISBN 978-0-253-21999-2

Here is Marston and Sundaram's detailed verdict on the War of 1965:

Verdict: Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained a stalemate.

The Indian gains led to a major Pakistani counterattack on September 1 in the southern sector, in Punjab, where Indian forces were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The sheer strength of the Pakistani thrust, which was spearheaded by seventy tanks and two infantry brigades, led Indian commanders to call for air support. Pakistan retaliated on September 2 with its own air strikes in both Kashmir and Punjab. The Pakistani attack on Chhamb was brilliant in conception but poor in implementation. While Pakistan made some initial gains, it was halted by Indian troops. As an answer to this, India decided to drive up to Lahore. What probably saved Pakistan was the Ichhogil Canal and the failure of Indian intelligence to reveal the existence of Pakistan's 1st Armored Division that was brought up to the canal to face the Indian forces.' The PAF had planned preemptive strikes against Indian airfields, particularly forward airbases in the Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan. Only 32 aircraft carried out this strike, and it did not have a major impact. The IAF in return used its Hunters and Canberras to good effect and attacked the Pakistani bases at Sargodha, Chaklala, Peshawar, and Kollar. Since this did not prove effective, the IAF switched to operating on deep-strike missions in Pakistan, launching its bombers supported by Gnats on road and rail targets in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. At the end of the war, both sides claimed large numbers of kills, but in the fog of war it was difficult to determine the exact number of losses on either side. (p 145) Command and control of forces on the Indian side under Prime Minister Shastri was clear, and objectives were defined well. In the case of Pakistan the politico-military objectives were vaguely defined, and no thought was given to finishing the battle. Instead, operational military orders tended to be rhetorical rather than commands, which led to confusion. On both sides officers were sacked or moved during operations, and leadership that had served in the first Kashmir war was sometimes found wanting. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chhamb and suffered significant losses as a result. (p 146) Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained a stalemate. (p 146)

Also pinging @Winged Blades of Godric:. I have to now write narrative prose in place of a list in the other article per promise made to @Gazoth: Also pinging @Kautilya3:, @RegentsPark:, @AshLin: for general wisdom, as I fear by the time I'm done, too much time will have been spent over something fairly simple. And I would rather not do a formal RfC and advertise at WT:INDIA, Military History Project, Village Pump, etc Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:21, 31 March 2019 (UTC)

Finally, I found a second, very recent, military history account: Gates, Scott; Roy, Kaushik (2017), "Chapter 4 The Second India-Pakistan War: 1965", Limited War in South Asia: From Decolonization to Recent Times, Routledge Series in Military Strategy and Operational Art, Taylor & Francis, pp. 65–86, ISBN 978-1-317-10500-8 This book has a very detailed description and assessment. It asseses the war to have been equally waged. Here are some excerpts:

Excerpts from Gates and Roy's Chapter 4 The Second India-Pakistan War: 1965, pages 65–86

Legacies and assessment, pages 80 to 86: "Major-General Sukhwant Singh asserts that at Khem Karan, the 4th Indian Mountain Division destroyed 107 Pakistani tanks. According to General Chaudhuri, the Pakistan Army deployed 620 tanks and lost about three-fourths of them. He counted 471 Pakistani tank losses: 236 Pattons destroyed and 26 captured; 60 Chaffees destroyed and 1 captured; 26 Shermans destroyed and 11 captured; and another 111 tanks destroyed within Pakistan. Chaudhuri claimed that the Indian Army had lost 128 tanks. Major-General Sukhwant Singh writes that Chaudhuri probably overestimated the Pakistani tank losses. India fought an attritional campaign, and the Indian Army at that time was not sufficiently combat effective to inflict three times its losses in armour on its opponent. The Indian tank units were certainly not Panzerwaffe(page 81)" "The PAF lost 73 of its fleet of 140 combat aircraft (Sabres 104, F-104 Star Fighters 12 and B-58s 24), and the IAF lost 33 aircraft (Chaturvedi 1978: 147). Air-Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi writes that the IAF halted the Pakistani advance in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector by attacking the enemy armour in the evening of 1 September 1965 (Chaturvedi 1978: 149). It seems that Chaturvedi’s conclusion is a bit overdrawn. (page 81)" "The Pattons and Sabres shaped the tactical dynamics of land and air war in favour of Pakistan. On the issue of command, both sides were on an equal plane. India’s bigger size and larger amount of resources saved the country from defeat. Pakistan probably underestimated the combat effectiveness of the Indian Army after its bad performance against China in 1962. Again, the US had already warned Pakistan in 1954 that in case of a war with India, all military aid to Pakistan would cease. Moreover, the US supply of spare parts was ungenerous (Effendi 2007: 187–88). Logistics was the Pakistan Army’s Achilles heel. (page 82)" "Major-General Jogindar Singh writes that Harbakhsh Singh’s plan for the 11th Indian Corps was formulated without detailed groundwork. ... Jogindar blames only Harbaskhsh for the fiasco at Ichhogil Canal Offensive, but the Indian COAS probably also deserves some blame for the fiasco resulting from bad planning and faulty implementation of this operation. (page 82)" "Both Harbakhsh and Jogindar write that the inferior performance of several Indian infantry units in this war emphasized the need to put officers and men through battle inoculation. The weak leadership of several COs resulted in desertions from several Indian battalions (including the Gurkhas). Thus, Harbakhsh challenges the so-called Martial Race syndrome in the Indian Army. The desertion was serious, especially for the 4th Indian Mountain Division: It went into action on 6 September, and within 24 hours, the strength of six infantry battalions had plummeted to three and a half battalions, only partly due to enemy action, and mainly due to desertion. (page 82)" "The IAF units operating from the airfields of Agra and beyond, without any briefing by the air contact teams that were left behind in the forward airfields, failed to provide timely and intense close air support. In contrast, writes Harbakhsh, the PAF from the Sargoda/Sargodha airfield was able to pound the Indian ground units efficiently (Harbakhsh 2000: 340–41, 346). (page 83)" "The Indian Army always feared an enveloping attack by Pakistani armour. Hence, the Indian armour was overcautious during the 1965 War (Rahman 1989: 101). Command of the armour proved to be a problem even for the Pakistan Army. Major-General Shaukat Riza rightly notes that the deployment of armour by the Pakistan Army was faulty. (page 83)" "Overall, we can conclude that both the Indian and Pakistan armies were good at defending defensive localities. However, both armies exhibited weaknesses in launching division-size attacks. During the Khem-Karan Offensive, the Pakistan Army failed to establish a corps headquarters to conduct a joint infantry-artillery-armour attack against the 4th Indian Mountain Division. At the brigade level, both the Pakistan and Indian armies exhibited some form of infantry-armour and artillery-armour attacks. But, infantry-artillery-armour-close air support, – i.e. combined arms tactics – was beyond the pale of either of these Dominion armies. Both armies used their tanks in penny packets (that is, as a squadron or a regiment supported occasionally by a battalion). Either a few tanks were used to provide fire support to the infantry in defended localities, or a few tanks supported by an infantry battalion were tasked for conducting limited probes. Outflanking thrusts over long distances by autonomous brigade-size armoured groups with mechanized infantry, self-propelled guns and close air support – which the Wehrmacht exhibited during the Second World War and the IDF in Sinai Desert – were beyond the reach of the Indian and Pakistan armies. (pages 83–84)"

Neither book is in the article's citations or bibliography. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 05:07, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose. I've waded through the superfluity of sources with a fine-toothed comb, and having done that, I also agree with the conclusion that, notwithstanding the excessive amount, the sources presented here won't suffice to usurp the present result parameter of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 article: virtually all these sources offer nothing significant but mere passing mentions of the war's result at issue in the context unrelated to the war. Even if we leave aside for the moment the fact that the policy on reliable sources encourages excluding such sources making passing mentions, there is even a precedent for this vis-à-vis the aforementioned article itself; vide Adamgerber80's comment here. I further warn Fowler to stop WP:CANVASSING. Orientls (talk) 06:03, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

Dear @Orientls: I have 30 times the edits on WP than you do; indeed I have more edits in the FA India than you have on Wikipedia. If you think I don't know what canvassing it, please take me to ANI. Please also read WP:Weasel and write clearly. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:31, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

• Comment. I stand by my proposal to go back to the old consensus which said Inconclusive, both sides claim victory. I don't think we will have consensus for anything more definitive. I am afraid the fog of war continues. I also can't disentangle political, military and diplomatic aspects to say, one was stalemate, one was victory etc. The military part of it was really a draw, not a "stalemate", because India had the staying power while Pakistan did not. All the scholars that say "stalemate" are basically following an old script and don't have any interest to examine it in any more depth. I am not sure why we should have so much interest in it either. All the war pages are in despicable shape. If we have energy, we should try and improve them instead of fighting over the infobox. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:12, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: "Inconclusive" is fine. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:06, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

PS Why do you think Marston and Sundaram make the determination of "stalemate?" Not sure India had the staying power. I think it is revisionist history produced by Indian historians based on a lot of surmising about information they claim Shastri did not have or was not given. India's more enhanced economic and military condition today should not blind us to the fact that both India and Pakistan in 1965 were impoverished nations on the periphery of the world order, no matter how many Bandungs Nehru had been to. The Bihar famine, which the Indian government continued to call a drought, was only two years away, as were the US airlifts of wheat. Btw, its not the infobox, I wasn't even much aware of it. Its the lead; and the section whose summary the lead purportedly is. That is the bigger worry for me.

PPS I just became aware that the Hindu nationalists decided to celebrate it in 2015, creating no doubt a climate of opinion in India. The same time that the slant in the article began. Check the lead before 2015. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:06, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

PPPS And here is the one paragraph summary of the war in the Oxford Companion to Military History. This is for enhancing my own understanding and and as a resource for future use, not for changing minds about the silly infobox.

Oxford Companion to Military History

"In 1962,a brief border war between China and India resulted in India's defeat, encouraging Pakistan's government to believe that they might be able to win a conflict between the two countries, in spite of the numerical advantage enjoyed by India. In January 1965, a border dispute over the poorly marked frontier of the Rann of Kutch escalated into conflict, although this was ended by agreement in June. In August, tension over Kashmir rose, culminating in further border clashes and claims by each side that the other had violated its territory. An advance by Indian troops was countered by a Pakistani advance, and a full-scale war ensued. By 23 September 1965, both sides were running low on ammunition after a UN embargo had been imposed, and a ceasefire was agreed. In January 1966, both sides agreed to return to the positions they had occupied before the war broke out. (page 439)"

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:33, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

According to Srinath Raghavan doi:10.1080/01402390802407616, only 14% of India's "frontline ammunition" had been spent, but the COAS J. N. Chaudhuri told Shastri that all of it had been mostly spent. Whether he had bad information or he deliberately misinformed Shastri, I can't say. He seems to be an old school gu,y brought up in the British Indian Army, who was basically after status quo, not an adventurer. He saw the Indian campaign as basically a defensive action, to remove the threat to Kashmir posed by the Operation Grand Slam. The Sialkot campaign, with its meagre gains, achieved that, and there was no need to continue fighting any more. The Sialkot campaign had the chance to achieve a decisive victory, but it blew it. There was nothing more to be done about it. The Lahore Front was a side show. Chaudhuri has said that India didn't have the strength to take Lahore or to hold it afterwards. Even though it had a big psychological advantage, that is not where the action was.

Not only was India a poor country, as you say, but the military had also been assigned a very marginal role in the society in the Nehru era. It was mostly starved for funds. Reason dictates that Akhnur should have been strengthened and alternative bridges built over Chenab. But it looks like they didn't have the funds for such things. We saw how badly equipped they were when they went to fight in the Himalayas. So, blowing more money and men in a pointless war wasn't in anybody's interest.

The relations with Pakistan were also not bad. Ayub Khan was a decent President, mostly focused on domestic development. He even offered to team up with India to fight the Chinese threat (and it was Nehru that rejected the offer). So I don't think Pakistan was thought of as an "enemy" as it is today. So, the Indians rightly assessed the magnitude of the threat, and acted accordingly. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:53, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

It was the 14% story I was referring to. It has been around in the Official (Indian) History of the 1965 War, long before Raghavan. No one other than some Indian historians believe it. What are the chances that only 14% of ammunition was used and neither the General nor the prime minister knew? And the outside chance that that did really happen, the war still ended in a stalemate, at the time it ended. "If ifs and buts," as my late mother-in-law use to say, "were candy and nuts, My what a Christmas we'd have." You did not answer my question about why Marston and Sundaram make a clear unambiguous judgment of stalemate. Anyway, on that note, I should add, I really am looking to find the more contemporary military history sources. Any help will be appreciated, especially about work by military historians from outside the subcontinent. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 15:50, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

Marston and Sundaram were the editors of the book. The passage you quoted is most likely from the chapter by Bhashyam Kasturi, of which Yaqoob Khan Bangash wrote:

In the post-1947 section of the volume, there is a chapter on India’s ‘State of war with Pakistan,’ by Bhashyam Kasturi which, based wholly on already published Indian sources, adds little to our understanding of the conflict.

I thought it was off the mark from the very first line of your quote, where he says "Punjab" whereas he should have said "Jammu" or "Kashmir".

For the 14% ammunition info, Raghavan gave two sources (the other being Palit). The official history itself cites multiple sources. It certainly reflects the poor state of organisation in the Indian Army, which the official history is taking pains to highlight. Note that it calls the result of the war a draw. The present campaign to turn into a "victory" is certain driven by BJP. But Indians are actively debating it. See for example, Indo-Pak war: Snatching a draw from the jaws of victory in 1965, Hindustan Times, 13 September 2015.

If you are inclined to believe that India did run out of ammunition, then I wonder what you make of this information, according to Pakistan's Air Marshal Nur Khan:

General Ayub was told on the second day of the war by the Army Chief, General Musa Khan, that the Army had even run out of ammunition.

This is covered in Ahmed, Ishtiaq (2013), Pakistan – The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), Oxford University Press Pakistan, ISBN 978-0-19-906636-0. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:16, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Thanks, first of all, for the article. I have the book here. I ordered the kindle version soon after I made the first post. I realized right away the error I made, but felt then I didn't want to confuse readers by going back and changing the citation with chapter info. I should have. The important thing is it has been vetted. It has a foreword by Stephen P. Cohen who says,

Short excerpt from foreword by Stephen P. Cohen

"Not only is this volume a breakthrough in the study of Indian military history, it bears witness to the argument made by the editors that this field has been grossly neglected by the South Asian studies community and by military historians. I would add that the changing international order makes the study of the military history of approximately one-fifth of the world's people especially relevant to our times. This is the first edited scholarly book to deal with the study of India's military history (India being broadly defined to cover all of South Asia)."

The chapter moreover has Kaushik's Roy's reasonably positive recommendation. See here.

As for the rest, a draw is a judgment; a stalemate is a condition. All stalemates end in draws, but not all draws result from stalemates. When they don't it is either because the player (the terminology is originally from chess) has miscalculated his options or is deliberately throwing the game away. (OED: stalemate: A position in which the player whose turn it is to move has no allowable move open to him, but has not his king in check. According to modern rules, the game which ends in stalemate is drawn.) India had no allowable moves open to it in 1965, whether Pakistan did or not is unimportant. No one is saying India lost. The 14% theory assumes that having access to 76% more ammo would have drastically changed the outcome, not waiting to consider that there's a lot more to war than having ammunition. First there is the question of what's on the books and what is fit for service (see quotes below). Secondly, they don't consider other factors, for example, that the Indian Air Force had taken a beating; the Chinese were champing at the bit to punish India again. All those things determine a stalemate. A recent paper by a sharp military historian, Rudra Chaudhuri speaks to this. See:

Rudra Chaudhuri (2018), "Indian "Strategic Restraint" Revisited: The Case of the 1965 India-Pakistan War", India Review, 17 (1): 55–75 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |special issue= ignored (help)

Short excerpt on IAF from Rudra Chaudhuri's paper

The PAF had an estimated 260 aircraft or 17 squadrons, including the F-104 Starfighter. The IAF had some 26 Fighter squadrons on their books. Effectively however, only seventeen were deemed fit for service. Further, India was yet to receive around 24 MIG 21s from Russia out of a total order of 38. The CIA estimated that even if these arrived in time to fight Pakistan, “India was not known to have sufficient pilots trained on the MIG 21 to operate three more squadrons.” The air war escalated quickly. ... 35 out of 59 IAF planes were destroyed while on the ground. ... So poor were the IAF’s logistical arrangements that at times – in Pathankot and Amritsar – the PAF “caught the IAF refueling in line abreast, thus presenting an ideal target.” Twelve aircraft were immediately destroyed or damaged in one instance. For the remaining part of the war, the IAF focused on protecting its bases against further pre-emptive attacks.

Short excerpt on the China factor from Chaudhuri's paper

What worried India most was Chinese military entry through “Pak held Kashmir,” which would allow the “Red Army to attack Kargil and cut off India’s Division in Ladakh.” The US confirmed that 97,000 Chinese troops were stationed in Tibet and Sinkiang together.119 By September 16, Chinese forces were found in strength on the border with Sikkim with an infantry Division moving from Lhasa to the Chumbi Valley area near the border with India and Bhutan.120 It is for these reasons that while India deployed three Divisions in West Bengal, Shastri made clear that India had “no quarrel with East Pakistan.”

Chaudhuri's conclusion, short excerpt

This study challenges the fundamental assumption that Indian political leaders’ disinclination to use force across India’s borders serves as the primary source for Indian strategic restraint. The case shows that restraint was in fact shaped by issues such as limitations in capabilities, especially during the conflict in Kutch in April 1965, and the threat of external intervention – from China – in September 1965. Indian political leaders’ approach was hardly antithetical to the large-scale use of force.

Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:38, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

Thanks for that. It is a nice article and in fact the first full-length scholarly discussion of the war we are seeing in this discussion. I have no problem with the conclusions drawn in this paper. But I also note that the paper fully supports my contention when it says:

Rather, as previously evidenced, strategic restraint was reinforced once India achieved its primary goal (of securing J&K) and only when external factors (such as the threat of Chinese intervention) limited Indian choices.

So it can hardly be called a stalemate for India. I know about the China factor too, but I also believe that the world powers would not have idly watched any potential Chinese interference in the conflict.

Note also that Shastri accepted the UN Secretary General's proposal for a ceasefire on 11-12 September, even before the Sialkot campaign was well under way, i.e., before the Battle of Chawinda. If the ceasefire went through, there would have been no need for the Sialkot campaign. This was also before China moved any troops, apparently on 17 September. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:46, 1 April 2019 (UTC)

I mean stalemate in the sense that there is nothing more the Indians or Pakistanis could have done. Both the US and China would have ensured that India could not have gone into Lahore, even if it had the wherewithal, the US, as an old ally of Pakistan, by applying unprecedented pressure, China by opening another front. The world powers would have acted in any meaningful way against the Chinese, only if the spur for the Chinese action was not further Indian advance into west Pakistan or new one into East Pakistan. Britain was upset at India for even opening the Punjab front, i.e. for extending a conflict over a disputed territory into a war between nations. After all, why did India need to open the Punjab front if it indeed had been prevailing in Kashmir. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 03:49, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

First of all,I would like to thank Kautilya, Fowler and Aman for the research everyone has put forth. Kudos! This is exactly what we need - a scholarly discussion :) Secondly, I would like to point, most of the research appears to indicate, that India exercised strategic restraint, even while Lahore was within reach. Now whether or not Indian forces would have could have should have had secured Lahore or not, both their objectives had been met - 1. Securing J&K and 2. Offensive inside Pakistan territory. I would argue that Indian position certainly had an upper hand having achieved objectives of securing its own areas and on offensive inside Pakistan territory - only to retreat to peacetime positions as a way to de-escalate. That unto itself is not a draw but a ceasefire and de-escalation via Tashkent accord back to peacetime positions after having secured their defensive objectives.. Sdmarathe (talk) 04:10, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

Dear @Sdmarathe: Thanks for your generous reply. The author's point is that India's goal of "securing J&K" was met only by the terms of the cease-fire, not before it. In light of India's air-force losses, of pressure being applied by the US and the UK, and of the burgeoning Chinese threat, whose previous memory from three years before was still raw in India, the cease-fire ensured that India would get Kashmir back even if it meant returning larger, but less strategic, real estate in Punjab. The author says, "The case demonstrates political primacy over military means. It also shows how limited capabilities, international demands for a ceasefire, and the threat of intervention on the part of China played a much larger role in shaping political decisions." and later, "As far as the US was concerned, the main red line for the Chinese was Indian military engagement in East Pakistan, and potentially deeper penetration in the west in and around Lahore. It was for these reasons that Indian envoys in London, Washington and Moscow were all urged by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to accept a ceasefire proposal as fast as possible." Best regards, Fowler&fowler«Talk» 11:55, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

PS More relevantly to current events, the author concluded with, "In his seminal study on perception and misperception in international politics, Robert Jervis begins by asking a seemingly simple question: do decision-makers’ perceptions matter? How easy or difficult, Jervis wrote, is it to distinguish between the 'world as the actor sees it' and 'the world in which policy will be carried out?' The key problem, Jervis surmised, is that 'decision-makers assimilate evidence to their pre-existing beliefs without being aware of alternate explanations.' In the contemporary Indian context, it is all-too-evident that Indian decision-makers see no difference between the world as they see it and the one in which their policies will be carried out."

Jarvis's and the author's words were brought into focus in recent events, when on February 27, 2019, Pakistan struck back, downed a plane, captured a pilot, and India has been working overtime to give positive spin to the events in the world in which its policies were carried out. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 12:02, 3 April 2019 (UTC)

Lahore was not "within reach". Neither have I seen any RS indicate that India had planned to go into Lahore. Rudra Chaudhuri has accessed enough internal documents of the Indian government (but apparently none of the Pakistani government) to give us an idea of India's strategy. Note in particular,

He [Shastri] stated that he could no longer “live from ceasefire to ceasefire.” Furthermore, the fate of Akhnoor and potentially India’s ability to defend J&K lay in the balance.

These are defensive strategies. I have seen it mentioned that capturing territory was not important to India, but breaking Pakistan's capacity to fight. "Breaking capacity" might sound like an offensive strategy, but it has to be understood in the context of living "from ceasefire to ceasefire", i.e., seeking durable peace rather than yet another ceasefire in a cycle of conflict.

So, while the Chinese threat is certainly important in strategic calculations, India's goals were modest in comparison to the Chinese red lines. Going into Lahore or attacking East Pakistan were never on the cards. Fighting a "long war" was not on the cards either, for economic reasons. Here is one analysis that states it explicitly:

Acutely concerned about the impact of the war on the economy, Prime Minister Shastri, Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari and Food Minister C. Subramaniam were all in favour of agreeing to a ceasefire on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution of 6 September. But they were strongly opposed by Defence Minister Chavan, who was not only reflecting his own views but also that of the leadership of the armed forces.

This was on 11-12 September when the UN Secretary General visited Delhi. The reason for the Army's opposition wasn't desire for a long war, but the fact that, at that point in time, the Sialkot campaign had just started. (This is what removed the threat to J&K, not the Lahore campaign.) But Shastri accepted the proposal anyway, telling the Army that Pakistan was unlikely to accept it and they would get more time. By 20 September, the Sialkot campaign achieved as much as it could. So the Army Chief supported ceasefire. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 06:28, 4 April 2019 (UTC)

Thanks, @Kautilya3:, for the clarification. Interesting. We certainly have enough scholarly sources. In the coming week(s) I will take a stab at summarizing them briefly and broadly in narrative form in a paragraph or two. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:14, 4 April 2019 (UTC)

References

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Semi-protected edit request on 8 October 2024

Change: "During this war, 1617 sq. miles of territory was occupied by Pakistan" To: "According to *Dawn*, during this war, 1,617 square miles of territory was occupied by Pakistan ([Dawn, 2018](https://www.dawn.com/news/1429931))." Muhammad Ahsan2233 (talk) 07:12, 8 October 2024 (UTC) Muhammad Ahsan2233 (talk) 07:12, 8 October 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: I can't find the point in the article you're referencing. Additionally, we don't require MLA-formatted citations. — BerryForPerpetuity (talk) 13:22, 8 October 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 10 October 2024

At the beginning of this Wikipedia post it says this war was a 17-week war. Instead, it should say it was a 17-day war. 208.102.178.242 (talk) 21:37, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

 Done M.Bitton (talk) 22:06, 10 October 2024 (UTC)

Recent edits

There have been recent edits by a blocked sock puppet. There have also been edits by Pax98, mainly regarding losses, in the infobox and a table in the body of the article for which there are concerns. Expanding the infobox with various detailed claims of losses is contrary to WP:INFOBOXPURPOSE. Such detail should be left to the body of the article. The infobox is already quite bloated and we should be striving to deflate rather than inflate the infobox further. There are also issues with sourcing and particularly this source, which does not appear to support some of the claims it has been cited to support and, more importantly, it does not appear to be a WP:RS.

Consequently, I have manually reverted (see here), to remove such material. I have also removed some text which cites GlobalSecurity - this being listed at WP:RSP as an unreliable source. There is no issue with adding reliably sourced material to the body of the article. However, whether such material should also be added to the infobox is another issue. We also need to be aware of the potential to create inconsistencies within the article overall. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:54, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

Alright, but why revert the Strength section??!! Pax98 (talk) 11:18, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

For losses, please read strengths and losses. My comments regarding losses reported in the infobox equally apply to strengths reported in the infobox. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:12, 18 October 2024 (UTC)

Ok, let me ask you just one final thing - what is more important to you - being factual or being more streamlined?? Why revert the figures back to what we know to be factually incorrect?? Pax98 (talk) 01:17, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

This is not a reasonable question, that it can be simplistically reduced to an either/or proposition, because the reality is both are important and one can achieve both. I have not said that verifiable material can't be added to the body of the article though one must also remember WP:VNOT. However the guidance at WP:INFOBOXPURPOSE is quite clear. The infobox is not for detail or nuance and we should not be trying to write the article in the infobox. There are two key issues: the verifiability of some of the material added; and, where some of the material was added (ie to the infobox rather than the body of the article). In some cases, the info added to the infobox was not verifiable, so that was a double-whammy. We can move forward with the info you have added (and would wish to add) but keeping in mind these two issues. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:07, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

While that's all good and dandy, that's not what I meant at all!! You wanted to keep it brief, that's all good but why does it have to come in the expense of authenticity when you simply could have simply used the sum total value of their tank strength instead??!!

"In some cases, the info added to the infobox was not verifiable,"

-

With all due respect, can you kindly be more specific?? Which particular info you're talking about, please let me know. Pax98 (talk) 05:57, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

Try the source I linked. At least 200+ confirmed in infobox is not verifiable from that souce cited in table in body of article. Cinderella157 (talk) 06:17, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

You do realize that we are talking about the strength section in the info box, right?? Pax98 (talk) 11:03, 19 October 2024 (UTC)

OK, for Patons, you have replaced a verified figure with an unverified figure. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:26, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

I provided not one, not two but three completely neutral sources (including one from a Pakistani military historian) that more or less back up my claim.

With all due respect, if this does not count as verified to you, then I've no idea what will. Pax98 (talk) 14:18, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

Re * 330-350 M47 Pattons delivered between 1955–60, there is not now nor was there before in your previous edit a citation to support the. However, there was a citation to support a different figure. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:50, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

One source mentions the figure 330 while another 347 - that's why, for the sake of transparency, I decided to put it like that - a range rather than one specific number. By the way, what's 186 times 3?? As you may see, one way or another, all three of my sources give basically the same figure of ~540-550 Pattons in Pakistani service at the beginning of the conflict. Pax98 (talk) 01:42, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

It is now clearer that you intend the citations to cover both dot points. There has been a difference of understanding. The two dot-points for Pattons delivered before 1960 and after 1960 require separate citations (they are effectively different paragraphs). Please place citations that are relevant to a particular dot-point next to that particular dot-point (ie all three don't apply to both dot points). This will then be resolved. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:54, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

Ok, will do once I get the time. Regards. Pax98 (talk) 11:35, 21 October 2024 (UTC)